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History and Analysis
By Linus A. Hoskins
In recent years international hysteria has erupted in regard to the astronomical debt burden of Third World countries. 
And there have been headlines suggesting 
that never before have so many countries 
owned so much to so few. There has also 
been fear of an eventual collapse in interna­
tional financial markets, followed by global 
recession and economic depression.
Basically, four events triggered the debt 
crisis: (i) in March 1981, Poland notified its 
creditors that it could not pay $2.5 billion 
out of its total foreign debt of $27 billion 
that year; (ii) in August 1982, Mexico 
indicated that it could not pay the interest 
on its $80 billion debt; (iii) Brazil quickly 
followed with the announcement that it too 
was unable to pay $446 million in interest 
payment on its $87 billion debt; (iv) Argen­
tina fell behind on interest payments on its 
$40 million debt.
This article will examine the magnitude, 
causes, and cost of the Third World debt 
situation. Also, the article will analyze the 
reaction by some Third World countries to 
the debt situation, and the different plans 
that have been put forward to deal with this 
intractable problem. In the conclusion, 
solutions to the debt problem will be put 
forward.
The plans to be analyzed are the Baker 
Plan (named after U.S. Treasury Secretary 
James A. Baker III); the Bradley Plan 
(named after Sen. Bill Bradley, D-NJ.); the 
La Falce Plan (named after Rep. John J. La 
Falce, D-N.Y.); and the Schumer Plan 
(named after Rep. Charles Schumer, D- 
N.Y.).
Magnitude of Third World Debt
If one were to take a cursory look at the 
total external debt of Third World coun­
tries, one would find that the figure has now 
reached an estimated peak of US $1,080 
trillion. In general, according to the World 
Bank, the total outstanding external debt of
109 Third World countries has jumped from 
$650 billion in 1980 to more than a trillion 
in 1987.
The 1980-87 figures prove that there has 
been a phenomenal increase of 67 percent 
in Third World foreign debt over those 
years. In more specific terms, Latin Amer­
ica’s foreign debt now stands at $400 billion. 
The figure for Africa is $170 billion; for the 
members of CARICOM (Caribbean Com­
mon Market), $7.5 billion.
On individual country basis, Brazil owes 
$108 billion, Mexico $106 billion, Argentina 
$52 billion, Nigeria $23 billion, Chile $20 
billion, Peru $15 billion, Zambia $4.5 bil­
lion, Jamaica $4.3 billion, Barbados $500 
million, Trinidad and Tobago $3 billion, 
Guyana $1 billion, Tanzania $3.6 billion, 
and Zimbabwe $2.1 billion. (See table for 
Third World debt indicators, 1980-1986.)
to shoulder the foreign debt burden. In 
order to fill this financial and development 
vacuum, these countries have to borrow—a 
vicious circle of the debt trap of depend­
ency, underdevelopment and Balkanization.
How then can Third World countries ever 
generate or achieve self-sustained growth?
The salient fact is, in the Third World, 
the debt crisis has diverted attention from 
the real problem — a development crisis. 
Let us analyze the debt indicators table: In 
1980, there was a 20 percent ratio between 
GNP and foreign debt; by 1986, the figure 
escalated to 35 percent. This high ratio 
proves the point made earlier in terms of 
the gains from domestic productivity 
(GNP) benefiting foreign interests, i.e., 
foreign commercial banks and financial 
institutions such as the International Mon­
etary Fund [IMF] and the World Bank. Over
Third World Debt Indicators (in percent)
Indicator 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Ratio of debt to GNP 20.6 22.4 26.3 31.4 33.0 35.8 35.4
Ratio of debt to exports 90.0 98.0 117.6 134.8 121.2 143.7 144.5
Debt service ratio 16.0 17.5 20.6 19.4 19.5 21.4 22.3
Ratio of debt service 
to GNP 3.7 4.0 4.6 4.5 4.9 5.3 5.5
Ratio of interest service 
to exports 6.9 8.3 10.4 10.1 10.3 10.8 10.7
Source: World Bank, World Development Report 1987. p. 18.
At first glance, what is striking in the 
table is that when compared to a previous 
year, only in six instances do the indicators 
actually decline. But more importantly, the 
table shows how much of their development 
effort/output Third World countries have to 
sacrifice in order to pay a huge foreign debt. 
In other words, any productivity that takes 
place does not benefit the people nor the 
country but foreign interests. The bulk of 
any foreign earnings/exchange that is gen­
erated from exports have to be siphoned off
the 1980-86 period, there was a 29.2 
percent average ratio of debt to GNP. In 
fact, Third World countries are paying back 
about $27 billion annually to commercial 
banks in the West, while getting about $18 
billion from the IMF and the World Bank. 
This means then that there is a net outflow 
of $9 billion of capital from poor under­
developed countries to rich, industrialized 
countries.
The debt indicator for exports seems too 
ghastly to contemplate. In this category, the
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ratio was 90 percent in 1980, but escalated 
to 144.5 percent in 1986. With this skewed 
relationship and increasing protectionism in 
the industrialized countries, export promo­
tion is a misnomer. The 7-year average for 
this indicator is a whopping 121.4 percent.
In the debt service ratio category (the 
sum of payments a country makes on its 
external debt divided by the exports of 
goods and services), the percentage fluctu­
ates but still was an astonishing 22.3 
percent in 1986. The higher the debt 
service ratio, the greater the debt burden 
and the more dependent and under­
developed a country becomes. This ratio 
shows how mercilessly Third World coun­
tries are being dragged through the eco­
nomic wringer.
While Third World total external foreign 
debt increased by 67 percent over the 7- 
year period, their debt service ratio has 
increased by about 60 percent. The average 
for this indicator was 19.5 percent. And 
when one looks at the ratio of debt service 
to GNP indicator, there are comparable 
deleterious trends. The two ratios increase 
or decrease simultaneously over the years.
The debt serivce to GNP ratio almost 
doubles over the period with a 4.6 percent 
average. The last debt indicator, ratio of 
interest service to exports is frightening. It 
shows what percentage of export earnings 
Third World countries have to allocate to 
defray interest payments on foreign debt. 
Indeed, this indicator suggests that for the 
past five years, one-tenth of the export 
earnings of Third World countries went 
solely toward paying interest on foreign 
debt. The average for this indicator stands 
at 9.6 percent, almost doubling over the 
period. Although World Bank net new long­
term loans to Third World countries de­
clined from $75 billion in 1981 to $30 billion 
in 1985, the interest paid on these loans 
increased from $40 billion in 1981 to $50 
billion in 1985.
In Latin America, $400 billion foreign- 
debt represents 60.5 percent of the value of 
exports of the six major countries. Out of 
every dollar earned from exports, individ­
ual countries must pay up to 40 cents for 
debt service. If this situation persists, it will 
inevitably lead to social and political de- 
stabilization in the region.
In 1983, for example, the region’s foreign 
debt stood at $336 billion; this represented 
four and a half times the amount in 1975 and 
56 percent of the region’s GNP. The interest 
payment on that debt was 38 percent of all 
foreign exchange receipts from exports in
1982-83, compared with 13 percent in 1975 
and 16.5 percent in 1978. On a country-by­
country basis, it has been estimated that in 
1985 Brazil’s interest payments as a per­
centage of its export earnings was 44 
percent; the figure for Mexico was 37 
percent; for Chile 47 percent; for Bolivia 60 
percent and for Argentina 55 percent.
The net outflow of money from Latin 
America in the past five years has averaged 
$25 billion annually, not counting capital 
flight. In other words, money is leaving 
Latin America for the industrialized world
The net outflow of money 
from Latin America in the 
past five years has aver­
aged $25 billion annually, 
not counting capital flight.
at a very crucial time when it is needed for 
development. This outflow and the drop in 
living standards have led many economists 
to describe the region’s economic situation 
as the worst since the 1930s. Even the 
president of the Inter-American Develop­
ment Bank (IDB), Antonio Ortiz-Mena, 
was compelled to warn that “some Third 
World countries will default on their debts if 
(Western) commercial banks keep taking 
back more money in repayments than they 
put out in new loans.”1
In the case of Africa, the annual cost of 
servicing $170 billion foreign debt is about 
$12 billion — enough to eat up one-half of 
the continent’s total export earnings. The 
total foreign debt of Africa, south of the 
Sahara, was more than $57 billion at the 
end of 1984; and the annual debt service 
was $5.9 billion in 1982-1984. The figure 
for 1985-87 has been estimated to be $10.7 
billion.
In Africa, debt service payments con­
sume about 50 percent of the export 
earnings in several sub-Saharan countries. 
For example, Sudan, Mozambique and 
Madagascar owe more in loan payments to 
foreign creditors than what they can obtain 
from exports each year. Nigeria, on the 
other hand, has to allocate 36 percent of its 
exports earnings as interest payments on 
its $23 billion foreign debt. In the case of 
Zambia, with an estimated $650 million
export earnings in 1987, the country was 
expected to pay debts of about $400 million 
to the IMF, about $71 million to the World 
Bank, and nearly all of the balance to 
Western interests. This again is another 
development Catch 22. The country then 
has no other recourse but to borrow money 
for development projects, despite the fact it 
has used up its finite factor endowments to 
produce a huge volume of exports. This 
productivity has not benefited the country; 
in fact, the country is worse off. In 1984, 
Zambia’s per capita GNP was $470 but its 
per capita debt was $429.
Africa’s foreign debt grew at an average 
annual rate of 20.8 percent from 1971 to 
1982, while the number of African coun­
tries recording negative growth rates 
reached 27 (out of 50) between 1974 and 
1982.
According to the U.N. Economic Com­
mission for Africa, the combination of 
falling commodity prices and rising debt 
payments bled Africa of about $30 billion 
during 1985-86.2 In fact, commodity prices 
are one-quarter to one-third what they 
were in the 1970s when African countries 
borrowed heavily to finance development 
projects. Under these circumstances, it 
seems impossible for any African govern­
ment to undertake new investments and 
development projects for growth and to 
import vital resources needed to maintain 
current export levels. Or as the U.N. 
Commission’s executive director, Adebayo 
Adedeji, surmises:
“Africa, poor as it is, continues to be a net 
exporter of resources, paying more in debt 
service than the combined total of what it 
receives in foreign aid and earns from 
commodity exports. . .  .”3
Causes of Third World Debt
The Third World “debt crisis is coming 
more and more to be a trade crisis. The link 
between trade and debt is crucial.”4 For­
eign debt and trade are closely linked 
because Third World countries cannot build 
up foreign exchange reserves and pay off 
their huge debts if protectionism in the rich 
industrialized countries prevents them 
from exporting their products. This loss of 
export earnings is one reason many of these 
Third World countries have been unable to 
continue normal payments on their foreign 
debt and have been forced to seek loan 
extensions from private commercial banks 
in the West and emergency aid from the 
IMF. Compounding this situation is the fact
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that the bulk of the money Third World 
countries earn from exports flows out to 
pay debt interest, thus blocking their ability 
to use trade surpluses to stimulate self- 
sustained economic growth.
According to the IDB, Latin America’s 
“huge foreign indebtedness is the result of 
the combined effects of a wide range of 
circumstances that are endogenous to their 
economies, relative to their current struc­
ture, operations and policies; and of the 
effect of adverse changes in the world 
economy on the region’s foreign trade and 
financial relations.”5 In a study, “The Exter­
nal Debt of Latin America,” the IDB 
outlines the specific internal and external 
causes of the region’s foreign debt as 
follows:
" . . .  Domestically, a major portion of the 
imbalance can be attributed to the policy of 
expanding final demand in investment, to 
the lack of appropriate incentives to sav­
ings, to deficiencies in the management of 
exchange policies and to the absence of a 
stringent policy on the acquisition of for­
eign debt. External causes include a four­
fold increase in oil prices in 1973; the 
deterioration in many oil importing coun­
tries’ terms of trade; the 1974-1975 world­
wide economic recession and the slow and 
partial recovery later; protectionist trends 
in the industrialized countries after 1979; 
the second rise in oil prices; and the 
worldwide economic recession which began 
in 1980.
“These developments were followed by (a) 
the record rise in nominal and real interest 
rates in the main financial markets; (b) the 
readjustment in the industrialized coun­
tries; and (c) the imbalances between the 
foreign exchange rates of major currencies. 
Thus the decline in activity and world 
trade was concerted into the most severe 
general crisis since the thirties.. . . ” 6
And in an analysis of the debt crisis in 
Africa, development economist Robert S. 
Browne suggests the following causes for 
Africa’s debt crisis:
" . . .  Two prolonged periods of drought, a 
sevenfold increase in the price of oil, 
recession and inflation in the indus­
trialized countries resulting in weakened 
demand for African products, persistent 
deterioration in the terms of trade, un­
precedentedly high interest rates, and a 
severely overvalued dollar have all helped to 
place Africa in an economic squeeze which 
has drastically altered the continent’s devel­
opmental prospects and indeed threaten the
orderly survival of several nations as thriv­
ing and coherent political entities. These 
externally originating catastrophes have 
been exacerbated by various internal fac­
tors such as localized wars, inefficient 
management, and inappropriate economic 
policies, including some which have dam­
aged productivity in the all important 
agricultural sector without producing 
compensating output in other productive 
sectors.
“Many governments, when confronted 
with this series of shocks to their economies,
Third World countries are 
caught in a vicious circle 
because they have to de­
vote so much of their rev­
enues and export earnings 
to debt servicing.
attempted but were unable to reduce ex­
penditures as swiftly as revenues were 
falling and to cut back on imports in 
parallel with the shrinkage of their export 
earnings. Instead they resorted to deficit 
financing both in their domestic budgets 
and in their balance of payments, which 
merely fueled the inflation which had al­
ready been created by the rising cost of 
imports. Strenuous efforts were of course 
made to cut imports, but since imports 
constitute a significant input into many of 
Africa’s exports, the cutback in imports 
soon resulted in serious declines in produc­
tion for export, thus furthering a self- 
reenforcing downward spiral. . .  .”7
Cost of Third World Debt
The cost of this mammoth debt on Third 
World countries is unconscionable. A sub­
stantial part of their national revenues must 
be set aside to repay debts at a time when 
commodity prices have sharply declined. 
Since 1980, revenues in Africa and Latin 
America have declined by 10 to 15 percent, 
and there has been a deterioration in the 
nutritional health of children in many coun­
tries. Third World governments wanting to 
reschedule their debts have been forced to 
accept stiff measures or “adjustment pol­
icies” imposed upon them by the IMF. 
Under the IMF “stabilization program,”
Third World countries have to agree to:
■ abolish or liberalize foreign exchange and 
import controls;
■ devalue currency;
■ implement anti-inflationary programs, in­
cluding (a) control of bank credit, higher 
interest rates and higher reserve require­
ments, (b) control of government deficit, 
curbs in spending, increase in taxes and in 
the prices charged by public enterprises, 
and abolish consumer subsidies;
■ provide greater hospitality to foreign 
investment.
Emphasis is placed on enhancing the 
profit capability of the domestic private 
sector and foreign investors. Where the 
majority of the citizens are concerned, 
however, a cap is placed on the consumption 
of the essentials of life (food, shelter, health, 
education, and transportation) so as to free 
or divert more funds to the domestic 
business sector. The IMF has argued that 
“. . .  only if large corporations invest and 
begin exporting from a country, will the 
country get out of the debt.” Such 
conditionality measures in the IMF “rescue 
kit,” although punitive on the broad masses 
of the people, do coincide with the interests 
of banks in the West whose financial assets 
are tied up in these countries. Some case 
studies have shown that these condition­
ality measures, in certain instances, have 
been imposed to destabilize governments 
whose domestic and foreign policies have 
been designated as “anti-American,” or 
Marxist-Leninist, leftist and Communist.8 
Third World governments that have felt the 
weight of these measures include Grenada, 
under Maurice Bishop; Nicaragua, under 
the Sandanistas; Cuba, under Fidel Castro; 
Zambia, under Kenneth Kaunda; Tanzania, 
under Julius K. Nyerere; Jamaica, under 
Michael Manley and Chile, under Salvador 
Allende.
In 1983, for example, 11 of the 20 largest 
Third World countries were under IMF 
conditionality measures. This number has 
increased significantly since. Some Third 
World leaders have vociferously protested 
against these measures. For example, Pres­
ident Kaunda of Zambia has described the 
IMF debt repayment conditions as grossly 
“intolerable.” Former Tanzanian President 
Julius Nyerere has blasted the IMF as “an 
instrument of the capitalist pow ers.. .bent 
on suppressing the weak developing coun­
tries by taking advantage of their poverty.”9 
President Jose Sarney of Brazil has ada­
mantly contended that the IMF program
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was “a recipe for recession and an inter­
ference in Brazilian domestic policies”10 
and vowed, in January 1987, not to sign an 
economic performance agreement with the 
IMF because he feared obvious domestic 
hardships and repercussions.
In the case of Jamaica, under Manley, 
government negotiators with the IMF be­
tween 1977 and 1979 have publicly de­
scribed the IMF measures as “punitive,” 
“murderous” and “a prescription for the 
downfall of the government.”11 Manley’s 
government fell in 1980. In two other cases 
(Sudan and the Dominican Republic), the 
IMF programs resulted in riots and severe 
economic hardship. Even the managing 
director of the IMF has been forced to 
confess that “too often. . .  it is the poorest 
segments of the population that have car­
ried the heaviest burden of economic ad­
justment.” 12
On top of these stiff IMF measures came 
the collapse in commodity prices, a steep 
fall in oil prices and a decline in economic 
performance for Third World countries. 
These global shocks not only vastly reduced 
export earnings but also made it more 
difficult or impossible for Third World 
nations to pay off their debts on time. For 
example, between 1981 and 1986 the 
commodity export earnings of developing 
countries, measured against the average for 
1979-80, declined by $8 billion per year on 
average despite expanded export volumes. 
The cumulative losses in their net barter 
terms of trade and export purchasing 
power amounted to $93 billion and $13 
billion, respectively.
Additionally, the real gross domestic 
produce (GDP) fell to 4.2 percent in 1986— 
from 4.8 percent in 1985 and 5.1 percent in 
1984. Also, trade slowed considerably in 
1986 as export earnings fell sharply and 
imports declined slightly. The 3.3 percent 
fall in the U.S. dollar value of exports — to 
$479.8 billion—marked the second straight 
year of sharp decline while the 0.1 percent 
fall in imports — to $501.5 billion — sus­
tained a long downward trend that left 
nominal import values at 9.4 percent below 
the 1982 level. The net result has been a 
worsening situation in the combined trade 
deficit of developing countries in 1986 — to 
$21.7 billion. This is more than three times 
the deficit of 1985 and also is in sharp 
contrast to the $5.7 billion surplus earned 
in 1984.13 The world economic situation 
has reached such a precarious state with 
specific devastation for Third World coun­
tries that the president of the World Bank, 
Barber Conable, publicly stated:
" . . .  Stuttering growth, volatile curren­
cies, high real interest rates, heavy debt 
loads, depressed commodity prices, rising 
trade barriers and outside (international) 
payments imbalances have acted in de­
structive combination not just to slow 
earlier rates of advance, but actually to 
erode many previous gains by developing 
societies... .”u
And in its 1986 edition of the World
Four different plans have 
been put forward to solve 
the Third World debt 
problem.
Economic Survey, the U.N. Department of 
International Economic and Social Affairs 
noted:
" . . .  The large imbalances in trade and 
payments that have in recent years charac­
terized the world economy persisted in 1985 
and early 1986. In particular, unprece­
dented disequilibrium prevailed in the 
trade and financial relations of major 
industrial countries, and there was a 
continued overall net transfer of resources 
from developing to developed countries, 
largely related to the international debt 
crisis. Both of these situations were, in the 
course of 1985, increasingly perceived as 
unsustainable, economically as well as 
politically.. .  .”15
While the economic costs of the debt 
burden have been devastating, the social/ 
human costs have also been of similar 
magnitude. The main human cost is that the 
struggle to pay interest on the foreign debt 
has siphoned off resources from social 
programs that benefit the poor majority. 
Unemployment has spiralled; poverty esca­
lated; basic human needs/services not de­
livered; standards of living have dropped; 
consumer prices (inflation) have shot up 
(e.g. Bolivia 8,216 percent, Argentina 850 
percent, Brazil 234 percent, Mexico 66.5 
percent and Jamaica 27.8 percent — as of 
April 1985). Worst of all, civil violence has
erupted in some Latin American countries. 
As one columnist noted:
" . . .  In many cases, the countries have 
taken food from the mouths of their citizens 
in order to sell it abroad. . .  (to pay off their 
debt).. .  ,”16
In some countries, central government 
investment has dropped by more than 80 
percent in real terms between 1980 and 
1985, and the government’s efforts to 
service the foreign debt has aggravated 
problems that had improved during the 
1970s.
Third World countries are caught in a 
vicious circle because they have to devote 
so much of their revenues and export 
earnings to debt servicing. Their ability to 
invest is severely undercut, along with the 
possibility for economic growth.
Reaction of the Third World
Just as some Third World countries have 
vociferously protested against the IMF 
conditionality measures, they have reacted 
likewise to their foreign debt situation. On a 
collective basis, in January 1984, 26 Latin 
American and Caribbean countries con­
vened in Quito, Ecuador, to deal with the 
region’s $400 billion external debt problem. 
They unanimously adopted the Declaration 
of Quito and Plan of Action. They asserted: 
" . . .  Responsibility for the external debt 
problem must be shared by the debtor and 
the developed countries, the international 
private banking system and the multi­
lateral finance organizations.. .  .”17
" . . .  The Latin American and Caribbean 
countries have already assumed their re­
sponsibility by making extraordinary ad­
justments in their economies and enor­
mous efforts to meet their international 
obligations, despite the high social, political 
and economic cost involved.. .  .”18
They further agreed:
" . . .  Because of these circumstances and 
the need to maintain adequate levels of 
development in Latin America and the 
Caribbean and to avoid greater crises in 
the international economic and financial 
system, it is to the mutual benefit of those 
concerned that an urgent solution be found 
to the problem of the region’s external 
d e b t... .”19
In May 1984, the governments of four of 
the most heavily indebted Latin American
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countries met in Mexico to discuss a 
proposal to extend debt repayments over a 
15-year period. The proposal, which was 
circulated in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, 
and Mexico, sought to repay debts over a 
period of nine years after a six-year grace 
period. Brazil wanted the period to extend 
to 10 years with a five-year grace period.
The proposal also sought the following: 
(i) a repayment schedule similar to a 
graduated mortgage, with smaller pay­
ments at the outset that would gradually 
increase and interest rates fixed for each 
country according to the circumstances 
surrounding each one and its possibility of 
economic recovery, (ii) debt payments 
based on the export incomes of the individ­
ual countries and set so the payments 
should not absorb more than is compatible 
with the maintenance of adequate levels of 
internal productive activity.
The four governments argued that the 
rationale behind their proposal was that 
with current levels of external debt and 
declining economic activity, Latin Amer­
ican governments are being forced to 
choose between debt or democracy and 
that current repayment plans have turned 
the region into a net exporter of capital.20
In June 1984, ministers of 11 Latin 
American countries met in Cartagena, 
Colombia, to consider a variety of joint 
initiatives to ease the foreign debt burden. 
Among the initiatives discussed were: (i) 
the establishment of a formal system for 
proposing reforms in both loan payment 
terms and the international financial sys­
tem, (ii) compensation from the indus­
trialized countries whose policies restrict 
trade or increase the burden of interest 
payments, and ways to place limits on 
interest rates or annual debt payments, (iii) 
the drawing up of new guidelines for the 
terms of loan payments and to press for 
financial reform on the industrialized coun­
tries21 (a proposal the Reagan administra­
tion has strongly opposed.)
In February 1985, the economic and 
foreign ministers of the 11 most heavily 
indebted Latin American countries called 
for a dialogue between governments of 
lending and borrowing countries on the 
issue of external debt within what they 
called a “political” and “economic” frame­
work. Meeting in Santo Domingo, Domin­
ican Republic, February 7-8, the ministers 
reiterated their earlier proposals for resolv­
ing the debt problem and announced their 
intention to press for more liberal re­
scheduling terms for all of the region’s 
debtor countries.
In their final communique, the Car­
tagena Group called for lower interest rates 
on loan payments. The ministers also noted 
that because of the high debt burden and 
high interest rates, the region was sending 
abroad far more dollars to foreign interests 
than it was receiving annually, thus hinder­
ing development and growth.22
Toward the end of 1985, the Cartagena 
Group hinted at a confrontation with the 
multilateral and commercial banks and in-
Developing countries 
cannot achieve economic 
growth while continuing to 
transfer liquid capital 
resources abroad.
dustrialized nations when the economic and 
foreign ministers of the 11 most heavily 
indebted Latin American nations issued a 
set of “emergency” proposals for negotia­
tions on debt and growth, aimed at gaining 
concessions from international creditors. 
Meeting in Montevideo, Uruguay, De­
cember 16-17, the ministers stated in a joint 
declaration that living standards in Latin 
America have slipped back by a decade 
between 1980 and 1985, due to the decline 
in international economic conditions. They 
argued for a series of emergency measures 
to counteract the effects of high interest 
rates and adverse terms of trade, and to 
finance levels of investment strong enough 
to support a projected doubling of the 
region’s output.
In March 1986, a ministerial-level com­
mittee of the Cartagena Group met in 
Punta del Este, Uruguay, as a follow-up to 
their December 1985 meeting. During this 
emergency session, the representatives of 
the major debtor nations — Brazil, Mexico, 
Argentina, Venezula and Colombia—stated 
that there must be “significant changes in 
existing loan agreements, especially with 
regard to interest rates” and that “certain 
countries have reached the point where 
such changes, which would apportion the 
adjustment burden more evenly between 
lenders and borrowers, could no longer be 
delayed.”23
The ministers concluded that if lower 
interest rates cannot be obtained by debtor 
countries through negotiations with banks, 
then unilateral action on the part of the 
debtors is justified and the 11 members of 
the Cartagena Group would unanimously 
support such action. The ministerial-level 
committee did not propose unilateral action 
as a desirable course of action, but only as a 
last resort if negotiations with the indus­
trialized countries failed to reduce debt 
burdens sufficiently. The committee also 
did not discuss the question of repudiation 
of all or part of their external debt,24 as has 
been proposed by Cuba’s Fidel Castro.
In addition, economic and finance minis­
ters of the intergovernmental Group of 24 
on International Monetary Affairs, meeting 
in Buenos Aires, Argentina, March 1986, 
voiced concern that prevailing debt strat­
egies had failed thus far to produce encour­
aging results and stressed that the debt­
servicing ratio of developing countries 
would improve only if credit flows were 
maintained and new initiatives taken.
Also, the ministers called for an interna­
tional conference to discuss both the debt 
crisis and the transfer of vital resources to 
developing countries within the context of 
reform of the international monetary sys­
tem. As the president of Argentina, Raul 
Alfonsin, observed at the meeting:
" . . .  the debt crisis does not result pri­
marily from the domestic policies of debtor 
countries but from the impact of discrimi­
natory and inflationary policies pursued by 
a majority of industrial countries on the 
balance of payments position of developing 
countries. . .  .”25
And after a consultative meeting in 
Washington, D.C., April 1986, the inter­
governmental Group of 24 issued a final 
communique in which they reiterated that 
the failure of the current debt management 
approach to find a definitive solution to the 
debt crisis is deeply rooted in an inadequate 
diagnosis of the problem and, as a con­
sequence, there are inconsistencies be­
tween short-term deflationary adjustment 
policies and the need to obtain a long-term 
equilibrium.
On an individual country basis, in June 
1985, Peru’s President Alan Garcia em­
barked on a plan of “national resistance” in 
which he declared that his country would 
use no more than 10 percent of its export 
earnings to service its $13.5 billion foreign 
debt. In July 1986, he announced that this
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policy would continue for another year and 
that his government will limit foreign debt 
payments by private Peruvian companies 
and will also prohibit foreign investors from 
repatriating profits for two years.
In July 1986, Brazil’s finance minister, 
Dilson Funaro, told creditors that his coun­
try intends to limit its annual payments on 
its debt to only 2.5 percent of its GNP. The 
minister argued that Brazil could not 
achieve the annual 7 percent growth rate of 
its economy toward which the government 
was striving if it has to pay foreign creditors 
4 percent of its GNP. In February 1987, 
President Jose Sarney went further. He 
announced that Brazil would suspend inter­
est payments on its $68 billion in foreign 
commercial debt, about 23 percent of which 
is owed to U.S. banks. Brazil has to pay 
about $800 million in interest payments 
every month on its staggering $108 billion 
foreign debt.
In July 1987, Brazil broadened its mor­
atorium on foreign debt by announcing that 
it had suspended $1 billion in principal 
payments to the Paris Club, a group of 
Western creditor nations. The government 
stated that its action was not meant as an 
act of aggression against foreign creditors 
but as a means of defending its dwindling 
hard-currency reserves.
Further, in June 1987, Brazil asked the 
IMF to delay payments on its debt. The 
IMF has never before granted such ap­
proval. And no member of the IMF has ever 
reneged on loan payments. In fact, debtor 
governments regard payments of interest 
and principal owed to the IMF as sacro­
sanct. Brazil has been paying the IMF 
about $1.1 million a year in interest and 
principal. It has yet to unilaterally suspend 
its payments to the IMF. Brazil’s total 
external debt is $108 billion plus interest, 
$4.75 billion of which is owed to the IMF.26
Bolivia, in 1983, stopped making pay­
ments on its debt of $3.3 billion to commer­
cial banks; many banks had already written 
off the debt as unpayable. Also, in May 
1984, this “cash-starved” country an­
nounced that it was limiting repayments to 
international lending agencies (IMF and 
World Bank) to only 25 percent of the 
country's export earnings.
In August 1985, Bolivia’s President Vic­
tor Paz Estenssoro resolved to renegotiate 
the country’s external debt with its cred­
itors “without taking bread from the 
mouths of the people.”27
Ecuador, in February 1987, refused to 
make the required interest payment to its
bank lenders. The government stated that 
“cash flow” difficulties, precipitated by 
deteriorating oil prices, prevented it from 
making the payment. And in March the 
government cancelled all foreign debt pay­
ments for the rest of the year and appealed 
for international aid because of a series of 
earthquakes that destroyed villages and 
crippled the country’s oil industry. Loss of 
revenues caused by the quakes forced the 
government to discontinue making pay­
ments on its $9.1 billion foreign debt.
In Mexico, President Miguel de la 
Madrid declared, in February 1986, that 
foreign creditors must “share the respon­
sibility” for his country’s $106 billion for­
eign debt crisis and must, as a result, accept 
a reduction in interest payments. He ex­
plained that the chaotic oil market situation 
has deprived Mexico of $6 billion in antici­
pated income, reducing federal income by 
12.5 percent and the country’s total export 
earnings by almost a third. Mexico depends 
for two-thirds of its hard-currency earnings 
on oil exports. In his televised speech, 
President de la Madrid stated that Mexico’s 
debt-servicing load must be lightened “in 
accord with the country’s ability to pay” and 
that “requires sacrifice on the part of the 
international creditors.”
Also, he announced that Mexico will be 
sending proposals for new debt negotia­
tions to foreign creditors because the coun­
try wished to retain “the respect of the 
international community” and hoped to 
resolve the debt problem “through negotia­
tion, not confrontation.”28
Mexico’s proposals included: elimination 
of additional new borrowing, conversion of 
interest calculations from the US base rate 
to Libor (London inter-bank overseas rate), 
linkage of interest payments to the world 
price for oil, and deferral of payments of 
principal and interest on its old debt. 
Mexico also proposed to pay half of its 
foreign debt over 15-25 years.
A high ranking Mexican negotiator has 
stated that the reaction of the foreign 
creditors to the proposals was cool; they 
feared that countenancing Mexico’s de­
mand would pave the way for similar 
demands by Latin America’s other debt­
ors.29
Cuba’s Castro, in April 1986, told foreign 
creditors that Cuba will suspend debt 
payments for 90 days starting in May while 
seeking more favorable repayment terms 
and $500 million in cash to make up for a 
projected revenue shortfall. Cuba owes 
$3.5 billion to creditors in the West. More­
over, in recent months, President Castro 
has been vigorously urging Third World 
nations to repudiate the foreign debts they 
owe to banks and governments. Castro’s 
argument is that Latin America’s heavy 
debt burden stymies the creation of new 
jobs for the more than 100 million unem­
ployed workers in the region and inhibits 
financially strapped governments from pro­
viding basic human needs to their citizens.
And in July 1987, the Philippines govern­
ment announced that it would limit pay­
ment on its foreign debt to 10 percent of its 
merchandise trade and commodity export 
receipts. The government acted because 
payments on its $28 billion foreign debt 
consumes more than 45 percent of its 
merchandise export receipts, and accounts 
for 40 percent of all government expendi­
tures.
In Africa, in January 1986, Nigerian 
leader Maj. Gen. Ibrahim Babangida de­
clared that his country would use no more 
than 30 percent of its export earnings to 
pay its $23 billion foreign debt. In effect, he 
told foreign creditors that year either to 
settle for a little more than half of what they 
are owed or risk getting nothing. Nigeria’s 
decision, like Mexico’s, is based on the 
sharp drop in oil prices; Nigeria depends on 
oil for about 94 percent of its export 
earnings.
Finally, in July 1987, Zambia decided to 
allocate only 10 percent of its export 
earnings to pay its foreign debt.
Plans to Solve Third World Debt
Four different plans have been put forward 
to solve the Third World debt problem. The 
first is the Baker Plan, put forward by the 
Reagan administration. This plan was un­
veiled in October 1985 by Treasury Secre­
tary James A. Baker III during a speech at 
the World Bank-IMF annual meeting in 
Seoul. Its essential elements include: (i) 
adoption by debtor countries of compre­
hensive macroeconomic and structural pol­
icies to promote growth, balance of pay­
ments adjustment and lower inflation, (ii) 
increased lending by the World Bank and 
other multilateral development banks, 
amounting to an additional $9 billion in net 
lending during 1986-88 as well as more 
effective structural adjustment lending by 
these institutions in conjunction with a 
continued central role for the IMF, (iii) an 
increase in net new lending by private 
commercial banks over the next three years
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to support comprehensive economic adjust­
ment programs.
The Baker Plan also identified 15 in­
debted countries that would require net 
new lending from commercial banks in the 
range of $20 billion over the next three 
years. The plan stresses that countries now 
receiving adequate financing from banks on 
a voluntary basis should continue to do so 
provided they maintain sound economic 
policies.
In April 1987, Secretary Baker modified 
his plan because he felt that the proposed 
amount of new bank lending in his original 
plan was “clearly disappointing” in 1986, 
and that new and creative ways are needed 
to keep the flow of commercial money 
moving to the Third Word. The modified 
plan proposed that banks develop “a menu 
of alternative new money options” to avoid 
“periodic financial crises.” Baker rejected 
any “debt relief” or “debt forgiveness” for 
debtor Third World countries.
The Baker Plan had to be modified 
because there was widespread concern that 
it merely added to the existing debt burden 
of the developing countries, who actually 
need relief from the cost of servicing their 
foreign debt instead of new loans. In addi­
tion, the commercial banks only lent lip 
service to the original plan; they were not as 
forthcoming in lending new money to the 
heavily indebted Third World countries.
The second is the Bradley Plan, which 
was unveiled in Zurich in late June 1986. 
Senator Bill Bradley contends that debt 
management has stalled development in 
Third World countries, hurt U.S. industry 
and trade, lost the U.S. 1.4 million jobs and 
destroyed jobs elsewhere in the indus­
trialized world. He also links the debt 
problem with the potential for failure of the 
democratic process in Latin America.
The main elements of the Bradley Plan 
are: (i) development banks (as in the Baker 
Plan) would boost their lending by $3 billion 
a year over a three-year period, but in 
contrast to the Baker Plan there would be 
no new loans required from commercial 
banks, (ii) an annual trade/debt summit 
would be called and chaired by the president 
of the World Bank (using this forum, debtor 
nations who agree to economic reforms 
would get 3 percentage points of interest 
rate relief for a three-year period on all 
outstanding commercial and other bilateral 
loans, plus a 3 percent write-down of 
principal a year over a three-year period), 
(iii) to qualify for trade relief packages, 
debtors would make internally generated
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(not dictated from the outside) policy 
changes to generate growth, liberalize 
trade and capital flow, reverse capital flight, 
and keep debt management free from 
scandal.
The third is the La Falce Plan, a debt 
proposal in a March 1987 congressional bill 
“to promote a stable international financial 
system, expand world trade, and alleviate 
the Third World debt crisis.” The center- 
piece of Rep. John L. La Falce’s legislation is 
a debt adjustment facility which would be 
specifically authorized to assist creditor 
banks in the voluntary disposition of loans 
to heavily indebted borrowers. Also, the La 
Falce plan would be empowered to encour­
age countries with strong capital surpluses 
to apply these surpluses to investments in 
heavily indebted countries, purchase bank 
loans at a discount, and establish mecha­
nisms for passing along the benefit of any 
such discount to the debtor country. In 
essence, this would enable commercial 
banks to voluntarily dispose of loans they no 
longer wish to hold at a discount and to 
rebate most of that discount to the debtor 
country in the form of lower principal.
According to Rep. La Falce, his proposal 
for a new debt adjustment facility is based 
on the premise that the burden of existing 
debt must be reduced before “new private 
capital flows will or should take place.” This, 
in my view, makes sense. Not reducing the 
current debt burden before new lending 
money is received would be tantamount to a 
debt surtax on debtor Third World coun­
tries.30 This brings up the important ques­
tion of debt relief or cancellation recom­
mended in the Bradley Plan, but rejected in 
Baker Plan. World Bank President Barber 
Conable (a former Republican congressman 
from New York) has also rejected any form 
of generalized debt relief for developing 
nations and stresses that the Baker Plan 
should be the guiding principle in attempt­
ing to cope with the $1 trillion Third World 
debt problem.31
The fourth is the Schumer Plan, which 
calls for outright debt forgiveness or relief. 
The main elements of Rep. Charles 
Schumer’s Plan are: (i) traditional new 
loans, (ii) interest rate relief, (iii) forgiveness 
of some debt principal and (iv) debt-equity 
swaps.
In analyzing the four plans, it should be 
obvious that the Baker Plan would not work 
because its centerpiece rests on commer­
cial banks making more credit available to 
heavily indebted countries.
The answer to the debt problem is NOT
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more money but relief/reduction in the debt 
burden/cost. Only European and U.S. banks 
stand to benefit from the Baker Plan; there 
is no impact on the productive forces in the 
recipient Third World countries.
In short, the Baker Plan is geared toward 
deepening the dependent-underdevelop­
ment and Balkanization of the heavily 
indebted Third World countries. Further, it 
suggests that the “new money” is condi­
tioned on a program of growth-oriented 
adjustment being in place and approved by 
the IMF. And the commercial banks will 
lend only in conjunction with concerted new 
lending by the World Bank, the Interna­
tional Monetary Fund and the Inter-Amer­
ican Development Bank. By putting these 
institutions in charge of the implementation 
of the Baker Plan, the administration is 
skillfully securing U.S. control over the 
economic and political policies of debtor 
nations.
Simply put, the Baker Plan is akin to a 
credit card customer who owes, for exam­
ple, $700 and then borrows $700 from a 
commercial bank to pay the creditors off. 
After the creditors are paid off, the cus­
tomer still owes $700 in principal plus 
interest to the new lender. The customer 
then has to work hard or overtime to pay the 
additional costs of the new loan. In the long 
run, therefore, the customer is worse off.
On the other hand, the Bradley Plan 
suggests it is time to stop new lending 
which, in reality, comes right back to the 
banks as interest payments and increases in 
principal. This plan calls for fundamental 
changes, given the current reality that debt 
is piling up too high in developing countries. 
The strong points in this plan are loan 
principal write-offs and interest rate reduc­
tion of up to $50 billion.
Also, the Bradley Plan, unlike Baker’s, 
indicates, with fewer loans to repay, Latin 
America could afford more U.S. exports.
The only sensible plan, therefore, seems 
to be a combination of the Bradley — La 
Falce—Schumer Plans, which will focus on 
the most important elements—debt relief/ 
cancellation and debt-equity swaps.
Solutions to Third World Debt
How can heavily indebted Third World 
countries solve their debt problem? First, 
they should take a lesson from the Car­
tagena Group and resolve NOT to pay on 
their debt until a reasonable 10-year grace 
period elapses in order to give them enough 
time to improve their trade and balance of
payments positions. This is based on the 
premise that only economic growth of the 
debtor countries will enable them to ap­
proach any solution to their debt problems.
Developing countries cannot achieve 
economic growth while continuing to trans­
fer liquid capital resources abroad. The only 
way out of their debt crisis is to stop 
borrowing.
Second, they should ask for debt re­
scheduling or a moratorium, even though 
these are just Band-Aid solutions.
Third, in my view, Third World countries 
should force radical restructuring of the 
international financial and monetary sys­
tem within the context of the North-South 
dialogue. Also, they MUST demand as a 
collective debtor cartel that international 
financial institutions and commercial banks 
CANCEL debts either in whole or in part.
Fourth, they should limit only 10 percent 
of their export earnings toward foreign debt 
payment.
Fifth, they should demand better trade 
policies and less protectionist measures on 
the part of the industrialized countries.
Sixth, they should reactivate the idea of 
establishing their own independent devel­
opment bank — similar to the World Bank- 
IMF and IDB. This way they have control 
over development loan measures, thereby 
extricating themselves from the draconian 
conditionality measures imposed by inter­
national lending institutions. □
Linus A. Hoskins, Ph.D., is a graduate assistant 
professor, School o f Human Ecology, Howard Univer­
sity.
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